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15 MAR 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM:

Chairman, Emergency Planning Group

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Directorate Performance During
Snow Emergency of 11-14 February with
Recommendations

100-3-1

The Directorate of Administration Emergency Planning Group conducted an evaluation of the performance of our Directorate during a recent snow emergency. The findings are presented below and represent two major sections: first, the major events that occurred and secondly, a suggested emergency plan for weather emergencies for your approval.

SECTION I - EVENTS

Summary - The recent snow emergency did not pose any significant problems for the Agency. All 24-hour communications facilities were sufficiently staffed, and there were no interruptions to primary or back-up communications networks, links, microwave, telephone, or secure voice circuits. There was no computer down time or loss of applications availability attributable to the snow emergency and aftermath. The Special, Ruffing, and SAFE Computer Centers, along with the Data Access Center (DAC), all located within Headquarters, and normally 24-hour operations, continued to provide services without interruption during the snow emergency. These facilities relied on reduced manning and extended working hours to provide the necessary coverage during the emergency. The ODP-manned remote centers, located outside Headquarters, closed at approximately 1030 hours on Friday upon notification by the D/ODP, and reopened Monday morning. These centers do not normally provide primary support for operational applications and are not open in the evenings or weekends.

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While the Office of Medical Services had a shortfall of 60% and 40% in personnel on Friday and Monday respectively, all

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offices were manned and anything that had to be done got done. Cable traffic was screened and action cables were distributed. Employees and applicants who showed up for physical evaluation were examined and a few patient cases were cared for.

Although some people were inconvenienced in varying degrees, there were no severe personnel, security, or medical emergencies. Employee response was generally excellent, above and beyond the call in many cases. One employee was reported to have experienced a fall in the [redacted] parking lot enroute to his vehicle on Friday which resulted in some painful bruises. One Headquarters employee was released to go home on Friday to attend to his wife, who was expecting momentarily. With the onset of heavy pains on Saturday, he and his wife walked two blocks through heavy snow to a waiting four-wheel drive vehicle for transportation to the hospital. She delivered within 20 minutes after arrival. In spite of the dedication and stamina shown by many individuals throughout the entire emergency period, there were several organizational as well as some minor logistical failures which need to be addressed.

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The most significant and widely recognized problem was the lack of coordination between Directorates, or for that matter, between components within the DDA. There was no real coordinated snow emergency plan for the Agency. Each component operated in accord with its own procedures, sometime in conflict with the procedures of others. There seemed to be a general feeling of uncertainty among those stranded in Headquarters relative to where, or to whom they should go to for help. Some people, after attempting to leave and then returning to seek assistance, went to the DDI Operations Center. The Operations Center was receiving phone calls for information on food, transportation, etc., and attempting to refer callers to an appropriate component watch. The George Washington Parkway exit from the compound was closed during the evening of the 11th, even though the parkway was in much better shape than Route 123. A coordinated emergency plan for the Agency would have eliminated these problems as well as a number of others, and enhanced the efficiency of all during this period.

*go home
went
recovered!*

In addition to the need for a coordinated emergency plan, there is also a need for a single DDA emergency coordinator—one individual, responsible for balancing Agency support resources against support requirements during an emergency situation. This individual would be the single contact (focal point) within the Directorate, ensuring that component activities do not conflict with each other and that the personal needs of employees are properly addressed.

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A less serious situation, but one that has drawn a lot of attention because it had the potential for becoming serious, was the short supply of emergency rations, blankets, and cots in the Headquarters building. An inventory of these items just prior to the snowstorm revealed that there were 72 blankets, 164 cots, and 180 individual rations in emergency storage. These supplies were quickly consumed by OC personnel and the 350 to 400 people stranded in the building. Fortunately, there was a sufficient supply of food available in the GSI cafeteria, and the heat was maintained in the building. At a minimum, the supply of these items should be increased to accommodate 400 to 500 people for as long as two days. In addition, serious consideration must be given to providing emergency food, medical supplies, and personal comfort items (cots, blankets, etc.) for all outlying buildings.

who or how many should be in outlying Bldgs?

Given the resource constraints and severe weather conditions, snow removal operations went very well both during and following the storm. By Monday morning, all Agency facilities except [redacted] building parking lot were sufficiently clear of snow to provide adequate parking. In both of these locations, the responsibility for snow removal belonged to a second party: [redacted]

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Aside from the Agency assuming the responsibility for snow removal at [redacted] as has been the case at the Headquarters building, there is very little that can be done to prevent that situation from recurring. The [redacted] problem will require further study before options can be developed and explored.

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a. Personnel - The Agency takes the position that all personnel are essential; however, many employees did not see this as a realistic policy or did not know the policy. Until the word was received that Agency employees would be dismissed, the Security Duty Office (SDO) received numerous calls from Agency employees requesting the status of which Agency activities were opened or closed.

By the time many of our people arrived at work on 11 February, the decision had been made to release employees. Earlier arrivals spent much of their morning receiving the calls from their coworkers who could not get in or were stranded and sharing their experiences with those who did get in to work.

When the word was put out to close down, most people were able to leave and get home. However, some decided not to leave due to the road conditions or left and had to return. The

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Agency decision to dismiss employees by 1000 hours, rather than later as in some government departments, was appropriate and salvaged a situation that could have been much worse from the standpoint of persons in the Rosslyn area. The Agency shuttle was not used nor was it available at departure time. Since most Key and Ames building personnel use private POVs and public transportation, they were less affected than other outlying areas which are more dependent on the shuttle. 7

All OTE employees were advised on 10 February (the day before the storm) as to who was and was not essential, what course of action to follow if and when a severe storm developed the following day, that is, listen to the media for OPM instructions. This advice was passed to all personnel through the D/OTE's weekly meeting. A relatively small percentage of employees reported for duty on 11 February (estimate--15 to 10 percent and the same percentage for students enrolled in CoC courses).

Communications personnel in the 24-hour facilities, for the most part, reported for work prepared to stay as long as necessary, knowing they might not be relieved on schedule. Many of the personnel who became stranded acted as replacements for those on duty. Relief was generally not available until various times on Saturday, depending upon location. At the [redacted] for example, portions of two conference groups remained until Saturday after unsuccessfully attempting to leave Friday morning.

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Two members of Headquarters Security Branch (HSB) surveyed Headquarters building to ascertain if those spending the night had any critical needs. From this survey, it was estimated that between 350 and 400 persons spent the night at Headquarters. No critical needs were surfaced. Three uncleared persons spent the night in the receptionist area on the first floor along with several other Agency employees from other locations. Forty-six employees of the Mail and Courier Branch reported for work on the 11th. Nine remained throughout Friday night and Saturday to accomplish critical mail runs. By Sunday, the branch was back on a regular schedule. During the snow emergency period, there were no critical mail runs missed.

b. Transportation - The capability and overall effectiveness of the Motor Pool was greatly reduced by the distance traveled to pick up and return essential employees. Trips were made to areas as far away as Centreville, VA and Bethesda, MD. When possible, the distance an employee lives from Headquarters should be considered when developing essential personnel rosters. Most personnel who tried to get to work early Friday morning made it. Many who left after being excused had to turn back or became stranded on the way home.

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Motor Pool drivers were dispatched in an intensive pick-up effort which continued until about 0900 when incoming requests diminished. Motor Pool drivers continued to make periodic trips throughout the day to pick up relief personnel for the various watch stations and at 1600 began taking people home that had been stranded at Headquarters. Overall, the Motor Pool offered excellent assistance to some essential people, transporting some home, helping to dig out cars, etc. but at other times, they could not furnish all the transportation requested. Too few vehicles and too many requirements proved the case in the 11 February 1983 snow emergency. However, around 2000, the SDO arranged with OL/Motor Pool to transport the D/OF home, along with other stranded Headquarters personnel.

Limited shuttle bus service to outlying buildings began on schedule on the 11th. At 1030, the SDO was informed that road and traffic conditions were such that runs could not continue and that service would be terminated around noon. When shuttle service was discontinued, buses were running one hour behind schedule. All those requesting transportation received it.

DCI Security Staff borrowed SDO's one four-wheel drive vehicle to transport the DCI to his residence. This vehicle malfunctioned enroute from the DCI residence to Headquarters and was unavailable to the SDO during the remainder of the emergency. The Motor Pool loaned SDO a replacement four-wheel drive vehicle. It was used by the SDO to transport stranded personnel and pick up essential SDO personnel. The SDO coordinated the transporting of VIPs and other stranded employees to their residences. This was done through the cooperation of the Motor Pool which provided one four-wheel drive vehicle with driver and by an SDO who used the Motor Pool loaned four-wheel drive vehicle.

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c. Food/Facilities - The GSI Cafeteria Manager was contacted mid-morning on 11 February and arrangements were made for emergency food supplies in the cafeteria. GSI personnel served lunch in the cafeteria until 1500 hours. Leftover food from the noon meal, plus a small quantity of food that was being prepared for the evening meal was placed in cold boxes in the cafeteria. The keys to the cold boxes were turned over to the SDO. The SDO was also informed that there was a limited supply of food available in the Executive Dining Room (EDR).

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The Communications Watch Officer (CWO) at Headquarters building made early arrangements with the cafeteria manager to have some food prepared and in place for approximately 30 watch standers. Additionally, the CWO ordered two cases of dry rations [redacted]. The cafeteria arrangements were later negated by the Chief, HSB, who, after surveying all available food in the cafeteria, instructed the SDO that this should be used as a last resort upon the request of those 24-hour offices who indicated a critical need. Members of HSB picked up emergency supplies, cots, blankets, pillows, and C-rations from Logistics supply room in the basement and brought them to the SDO area. These emergency supplies were distributed to all individuals who requested same. There were numerous requests that could not be filled when the supplies were exhausted.

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The dry rations were considered to be not very desirable for people working under the conditions that existed. At various vending machines at Headquarters and the outbuildings, food was available in various quantities. Most watch standers were able to rely on other personnel going out to the 7-11 in their own four-wheel drive vehicles for whatever was available on Saturday morning. There were reports that the food in the cafeteria was eventually used, and that the EDR opened for Saturday morning breakfast. Neither facility was used by Commo personnel. [redacted] duty and manned the dining hall for those personnel stranded or aboard for duty. Food supplies there were sufficient throughout the storm. Sleeping facilities and general quarters were available and extensively utilized [redacted]

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On 12 February, kitchen personnel for the EDR were picked up and brought in to prepare breakfast and lunch. Because there was a limited amount of food available in the EDR, a decision was made to inform only the SDO and Logistics Duty Officer (LDO). At the time, no one in OL was aware of the number of people stranded in the building (another problem that would have been eliminated by a DDA emergency coordinator).

d. Snow Removal - At 0100 on 11 February, with approximately two inches of snow accumulation, snow plowing operations began and all Motor Pool personnel were called and asked to report to work. By 0200, Motor Pool personnel began arriving and plowing operations were intensified until all available equipment was in use. The intensity of the storm and rapid rate of snow accumulation throughout the day, limited plowing efforts to the entrance and main roadways of the compound.

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At 1000, a snow plow and 7 WAEs were dispatched to [redacted] building to assist employees in removing their cars from the parking lot. The [redacted] crew worked from 1100 until 1530 keeping the entrance road open and assisting employees. At 1530, the crew returned to Headquarters, leaving between 30 and [redacted] building employees who elected to remain rather than venture out in the storm.

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Well into the night of the 11th, all available OL personnel continued assisting those Agency employees who wished to remove their vehicles from the compound. Snow plowing operations were still restricted to the entrance to the compound and the main roadways by the rate of snow accumulation and OL resources. Clearing operations on the parking lots did not begin until around 2100 hours when the snowfall began to subside. The crew returned to [redacted] building at 2400 and worked until 0200 on Saturday assisting anyone who wanted to leave. At 0200, the crew returned to Headquarters to continue snow removal operations.

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On 12 February, GSA began participating in the snow removal effort at Headquarters at 0800 when three people arrived. The remainder of the GSA work force arrived at 1130 hours but were able to support OL efforts only in an indirect manner by clearing sidewalks and walkways. GSA equipment stored on the compound was not operational and much of it required maintenance by OL personnel to keep it operating. Snow removal continued throughout the day at Headquarters.

On 13 February, snow removal continued at Headquarters. The Chief, Logistics Services Division (LSD), OL, visited [redacted] buildings. [redacted]

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On 14 February, a snow plow and crew were dispatched to [redacted] Arriving there, the crew was unable to get the snow plow into the compound. One entrance had been blocked [redacted]

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operating the snow blowers for the remainder of the day and clearing the parking areas during the evening with a jeep equipped with a snow plow.

SECTION II - Problems/Recommendations:

(a) Our weather emergency instruction lists all Agency functions as critical and forces Agency personnel to make a specific judgement regarding their ability to report for work when a weather emergency has developed during non-work hours, regardless of the announcements in the media. This adds confusion and also increases the number of "refugee" type persons to be accounted for and supported during the emergency. It is recommended that each fall, on approximately 15 November, an Employee Notice be published on snow emergency procedures. Also at this time, a realistic list of essential employees should be identified by component with a practical and workable method to transport them during emergencies. By nature, this list must be restricted to those small number of personnel who are essential to the operation of the physical plant, those who man the various watch offices, and those who are authorized to make administrative decisions, i.e., the Directorate duty officers. Weather emergency instructions are published in the 24-hour facilities as standard procedures and are required reading for all employees. When the storm broke, those people identified as "essential" were either on board or called in according to instructions. All necessary stations and facilities throughout the area of the storm were either manned or closed as necessary.

(b) There does not exist a coordinated emergency plan for the Agency and as a result, there occurred a lack of coordination between Directorates and also between various DDA Offices. The cafeteria and EDR were not used to their full potential and there was an absence of official emergency information. There should be one central Agency emergency authority, properly staffed, coordinating all administrative activities during such crises. Well advertised, all other personnel would know who to call and where to go for assistance. The various DDA emergency response components should be put under the responsibility and control of this single DDA emergency coordinator. It is recommended that the Chief, Logistics Services Division, be designated as this functionaire and that a representative from each of the other Directorates be designated to serve on this emergency staff.

(c) In conjunction with the DDA integrated emergency plan, a central emergency operations center should be established and well identified so all employees have a central

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point of contact they can use during emergencies to get routine information on what services are available and what services have been discontinued or shut down.

(d) Emergency cots, blankets, and rations, and modified SAFEHAVEN Kits should be located in all Agency buildings, and a predesignated area identified for their use during emergencies. Allowance will be made to support ten percent of the buildings occupants for a minimum of three days.

(e) Whenever there is a high likelihood of an emergency occurring, the emergency coordinator should hold a meeting with those individuals he might need during the potential emergency and a thorough review of what might be expected should be conducted to prepare these individuals for their roles and procedures.

(f) Negotiations should be conducted with the GSI to explore the feasibility of adding a provision for emergency food service to the current cafeteria contract.

(g) The Agency inventory of official four-wheel drive vehicles is currently inadequate. Additional four-wheel drive vehicles that could be used for normal Motor Pool operations should be purchased during the normal replacement cycle. We should also establish a volunteer standby list of privately-owned four-wheel drive vehicles. *Liability?*

(h) The Agency cannot rely on GSA or its contractors during abnormal snowfall and we should purchase or make provisions for the lease of heavy-duty snow removal equipment. Additionally, the various owners of our leased properties cannot be relied on to provide timely snow removal and we should explore the possibility of establishing independent contracts for this service.

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(i) A plan should be devised to keep all roadway entrances open during an emergency.

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DDA/Planning Office (16Mar83)
Distribution:

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ATTACHMENT: Proposed DDA Emergency Plan, attached herewith.

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DDA EMERGENCY PLAN

Purpose: The purpose of this plan is to provide for the continuation of central support services during emergencies. It assumes that each of the other Directorates will formulate procedures for continuation of their critical functions and that their emergency planning will include the services outlined below.

Responsibilities: The Chief, Logistics Services Division, OL will be responsible for implementing this plan and approving changes as required. He will be the single DDA emergency coordinator with responsibility for coordinating and controlling the emergency activities of all Directorate components.

DDA Emergency Operations Center: A DDA operations center will be established under the command and control of the Chief, LSD. This center will provide for central control, coordination, and communications for Directorate response to any emergency. It should be well publicized and clearly identified so that all Agency employees have a central point of contact to get help during emergencies and to receive routine information on what services are available and what services have been discontinued or shut down. It will be staffed by Directorate offices as required and will incorporate coordination of the various office emergency activities and procedures, such as, Communications, Medical, Security, etc. The DDA operations center will be organized in such away that it has resources identified in the outlying buildings that can act as an adjunct of the Hqs. operation.

Emergency Personnel Watch Bill: This list will be restricted to a small number of personnel essential to the operation of the following functions:

del

- DDA Emergency Operations Center
- Headquarters Security Duty Office
- Communications Watch Office
- OMS Duty Officer
- Agency Operations Center
- DDO Duty Officer
- DDI Duty Officer
- DDS&T Duty Officer
- Ruffing and Special Computer Center
- Contractor Hardware and Software Maintenance Personnel

A realistic list of employees necessary to staff the above functions will be identified. The distance they live from their duty station will be considered in the selection process and a practical and workable method to transport them during emergencies will be established.

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Emergency Stockpiles: Emergency cots, blankets, rations, and modified SAFEHAVEN Kits should be located in all Agency Buildings and a predesignated area identified for their use during emergencies. A general rule of thumb to be used in sizing the amount of supplies and equipment is that allowance will be made to support ten percent of the buildings occupants for a minimum of three days. In addition, Chief LSD should negotiate an amendment to the GSI and EDR contracts to provide for emergency food service as required.

Emergency Vehicle List: A up to date inventory of official four wheel drive vehicles will be maintained by the Chief, LSD. This list will include all vehicles, regardless of organizational assignment, with the understanding that the Chief, LSD may commandeer vehicles for use in emergencies. This list will be supplemented by a inventory of privately owned vehicles owners of which may donate their time and vehicles during an emergency.

General Operating Characteristics: Once a year, in the late fall, an Agency wide notice will be disseminated with an update of the DDA Emergency Plan to familiarize and remind all Agency employees of procedures and identify personnel on the Emergency Watch Bill. The Chief, LSD will be responsible for balancing Directorate support resources against support requirements during an emergency situation. He will be the single contact (focal point) within the Directorate. This emergency operating Center's staff will also consist of a representative of each Directorate, a focal point in each Office of the DA and a designated support careerist in each outlying building to act as an adjunct of the Hqs. operation under the direction of the C/LSD. Additionally in the late Spring the Chief, LSD will conduct realistic exercises for all DDA personnel with emergency responsibilities to ensure that they have adequate capability to respond to real situations and that the proper channels of coordination are workable. Whenever there is a likelihood of an emergency occurring, the Chief, LSD should hold a meeting with those individuals he might need during the potential emergency and a through review of what might be expected should be conducted to prepare these individuals for their roles and procedures. When an actual emergency occurs, the Chief, LSD will activate the DDA Emergency Operations Center and will take appropriate action to respond to the immediate requirements of the emergency. As time and circumstances allow he shall seek required decisions and pass on information through the DDA Executive Officer to the DDA or the A/DDA.

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